

From Grand Strategy to Ground Reality: Examining Methodological Challenges in Assessing How Tactical Failures Impact National Security Goals

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DOI: [10.56201/jpslr.vol.11.no11.2025.pg124.135](https://doi.org/10.56201/jpslr.vol.11.no11.2025.pg124.135)

Abstract

This study examined the methodological challenges involved in assessing how tactical failures shape national security outcomes, highlighting the persistent gap between grand strategic intent and operational reality. According to the findings of the qualitative comparative analysis, these issues were present in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Ukraine tied with the loss of intelligence, and was themselves the issues in emerging and growing sets of mechanisms of failures at the tactical levels that shaped the vertical and horizontal chains of inaction at the strategic levels. It was long operational stasis, loss of initiative, and the growing complexity of opponents' response systems that tactical failures disrupted over time. The study also noted key methodological problems, such as lack of data, class restrictions, and methodological measures not being present in the matrices used. These issues were limiting the ability of researchers to examine in a more systemic way the phenomenon of misalignment strategy–tactics at the level of national security. The study emphasized the importance of addressing these tactical level shortfalls in conjunction with building the right tools of analysis needed in national security to provide realistic frameworks for the attainment of grand strategic aims in complex wars.

Keywords: *Tactical failures, grand strategy, national security, operational effectiveness, intelligence gaps*

1.Introduction

Understanding how grand strategic objectives translate into real-world security outcomes has been a central concern in defense and security studies. Experts often point out that even the best-crafted defense strategies at the national level may fail (Gray, 2010). The blockage is often referred to as the “strategy–operations gap,” and is heavily present in many modern wars where the governments' long-term intentions were hijacked by various on the ground issues (Cohen, 2002). It has become a big problem to figure out how lower-level failures and their subsequent bottom-line results on national security strategies. The problem is coming up with a synthesis of strategic theory, operational level theory, and theory from actual wars to get the results.

Studies have shown that possessing advanced military capabilities does not guarantee superiority or military deterrence; a state simply has to possess a ‘military edge’ (Biddle, 2004). While conducting studies on the actions of the United States and its allies in the Iraqi and Afghanistan wars, research has shown that state-building and the desired counter-insurgency goal was not obtained because of a lack in strategic execution that ranged in a loss of intelligence to compromises in the functioning and cooperation of ‘security’ personnel (U.S. Government

Accountability Office [GAO], 2017). This research illustrates a methodology issue: information on understated tactical errors is difficult to come by in a systematic manner.

Also, national security evaluations look at things from a bird's eye view, which can miss causality. These macro-level impacts can draw the focus away from the tactical errors that diffuse the focus. \rand\ analysts and similar defense experts point out those evaluation methods are out of touch with the real-time complexities of the battlefield, institutional inertia, and the enemy's creativity. These factors lead to a widespread disconnect between the grand strategy espoused in the governing documents and the reality on the ground faced by soldiers, Intel officers, and the host populace. Therefore, the national security studies field would greatly benefit from research designs that attempt to connect tactical outputs with strategy's positive impact while acknowledging the constraints from a lack of data and the security classification.

1.1 Problem Statement

Despite longstanding attention to strategy formulation in national security, there remains a significant challenge in systematically assessing how tactical and operational failures undermine strategic goals. National security, in large measure, is the province of the national strategy, and, to be sure, there is no shortage of large strategy formulations. However, the large strategy seems to be based on the assumption that the tactics will be executed. At the same time, the record shows that there is a continuing lack of alignment between the actions at the tactical level and the intended strategy, and this is worse at the operational level (Van Cleef, 2024). In addition, where there is a tactical level capability, there seems to be a lack of coherent political-strategic alignment to the operational level to ensure that the operational gains, if any, translate to the success of the broader strategy (Matissek, 2025).

The scope of the comparative methodological failures is rarely discussed. However, if they talk about tactical failures, such as fragmentation in command-and-control, breakdowns in logistics, and inadequate integration at the operational level, they are either documented insufficiently, or insufficiently to facilitate the comparative quantitative testing of the failures or they are simply classified. New operational policy briefs dealing with the Somali context illustrate how tactical failures in the streamlining of logistics and unity of command at the tactical level manifested as strategic failures in the counter-insurgency campaign. Similarly, they failed to explain many surprise attacks that they had foreknowledge of and whose success many attributed to breakdowns in command or integration of the structure (Ikani, 2025)

However, there is no strong, consistent, and comprehensive understanding of how a series of tactical blunders amount to a complete, overarching strategic failure. For instance, logistical oversights in Ukraine and other high-intensity theatres have been recognized as foundational in compromising long-term strategic military successes, not just losses at the operational field level (U.S. Army, 2023). Evaluations in national security will continue to be futile and simple in their explanations provided at the strategic level if there are no means of bridging the micro (tactics) and the macro (strategy) levels through design and measurement. This will result in explanations that ignore the chaotic operational level of military strategy and focus solely on the strategy's vision and objectives.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Review

Grand strategy is widely defined as the alignment of a nation's long-term political objectives with the coordinated use of military, economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of power (Gaddis, 2009). It is a single, unified, and coherent structure that transcends the limits of a campaign or policy and embraces the scope of a nation's macro decision making. Most Scholars like Brands (2014) described grand strategy as not being military in nature, but rather the overall plan of a state of a nation to protect its interest from the dangers of the world's uncertainties. However, a high level of strategy in practice is so grand that a level of coherence and the institutional capacity is something that is assumed but probably does not exist.

Operational military and security actions on a given day make up tactical operations that provide the basis upon which a nation can (or cannot) achieve its desired national security outcomes. In Biddle (2004) tactical prowess in the effective engagement of the enemy is in maneuver, fire power, coordination, and adaptation through battle which is a primary determinant in the success of the tactics exercised. In contemporary wars, the tactical level of the fight is the center of gravity (U.S. Army, 2023) as tactical failures as poor fusion of intelligence, delays in logistics, or delays in timelessness (interoperability) may lead to the protection of national security objectives and devastation of the world order. In addition, the state failures in strategy, as in the policy at the national level, are outcomes of the tactical level. In counterinsurgency, strategy some tactical errors' outcomes may be objectives of the strategy in the overall plan of the nation (Kilcullen, 2010).

One of the main concepts of security studies is the difference between strategies and the realities of operational situations. Cohen (2002) mentions how military strategists print battlefield strategies from the political dimension and how they forget to integrate the political dimension of the military tactical level. More recent studies (Gompert & Binnendijk, 2016) widen the operational gap to include organizational dysfunction, political fragmentation, and decentralized command (hence, the battlefield is described as a 'decision-making black box'). Iraq and Afghanistan case studies summarize how the operational gap from the synchronization of strategy to local conditions paradoxically resulted in extended warfare and 'strategic drift' (GAO, 2017). Tactical failures could always elude measurable metrics due to the absence of real-time operational and security information. The architecture of traditional operational assessments depends on after-action reports, military readiness levels, and narratives, while having varying transparency and quality (Biddle, 2004). Researchers of today are focusing on tactical failures in a more elaborate collection of strategies, volumetric of the battlefield, and intelligence to unclothe the tactical failures (Hiraal Institute, 2023). Some challenges still remain in the methodology, as flawed and politically sensitive data leads to inoperable assessments of the failures and little can be done cross case.

2.2 Theoretical Frameworks

Strategic Studies

State and organizational actors coordinate the pursuit of goals of a political nature and the application of force. This approach draws from one of the earliest military thinkers, Carl von Clausewitz, and his work, *On War*, published posthumously in 1832. Clausewitz argued that War, is, 'a continuation of politics by other means' and thus all military action is directed toward a political end. In the classical orientation, Gray (2010) contended that strategy is constructed at the interfaces of ends, ways, and means, and must be adjusted iteratively or in alignment with political objectives, available means, and changing situations. Strategic studies therefore provide a set of

tools to the strategist or the decision maker in order to avoid a loss of balance between the aforementioned variables.

Strategic failures occur when there is a breakdown in the Clausewitzian connection between conflict, force, and politics, especially when there is a mismatch in contradiction between tactics and strategy at the level of the specifics and the general. A military incurs operational successes, but may still frustrate overarching objectives because of the operational damage's collateral conflict legitimacy, unnecessary conflict escalation, and the alienation of operationally relevant population groups. Gray advocates for a strategy's perpetual malleability because of the need to ensure the alignment of a strategy's tactics to a prevailing overarching politics. When leaders lose the political, military, or means to manage and control the inevitable operationally static tactical centered work, a strategy's objectives diverge towards outcomes of military success but political futility as Clausewitz put it from the latter half of the 1800's, straying from the core purpose.

Military Effectiveness Theory

The Military Effectiveness Theory posits that a state or military's success within a given battlefield is not only a matter of how many resources a state or military has, but of how efficiently those resources are converted into a positive performance outcome. Brooks and Stanley (2007) noted that if an army has an excess of resources in the form of sufficient equipment, personnel, and/or technology, it can still be defeated if it lacks the organizational frameworks that are necessary to utilize those resources efficiently. The theory specifies doctrine, command structure, training systems, quality of leaders and learning embedded in an institution as the most important of many factors that can determine combat effectiveness of a military force. These factors determine how quickly and effectively a unit can adapt to a change on the battlefield, utilize a variety of different resources in a synchronized manner, and remain steady under duress.

This method explained why, on certain occasions, technologically superior or numerically advanced armies lose their strategic advantage. It highlights how tactical shortcomings including inflexible command structures, ineffective training, failure to adapt, poor communication, etc. can negate the advantages of superior resources. The theory of military effectiveness, focuses on organizational behavior and military decision-making and, to some extent, neglects the importance of pure military strength. In doing this, the theory draws attention to the fact that military forces may possess superior resources but, operationally, lack the competence to achieve success on the battlefield. These forces will, at best, achieve some minor tactical success, but will lose their operational tempo, the initiative, and strategic positioning, due to ineffective military operations.

2.3 Empirical Review

Tactical failures are just as prevalent in empirical research as they are in modern conflicts. Recent research on U.S. operations in Iraq surface issues pertaining to tactical intelligence, strength of protection, and coordination deficiencies with Iraqi allies which, together, achieved to reverse higher level strategic objectives. These objectives, with the grand goal of achieving stabilization and implementing democracy, were thwarted (GAO, 2017). Kilcullen (2010) also provided support to the foregoing analysis by illustrating the potential adverse impacts on the strategy level and public support of operational tactical mistakes which included harming innocent civilians and acting sluggishly in response to an insurgency thereby encouraging an insurgency movement. On the same note, Biddle (2004) addressed the issue of tactical and operational sequencing in the domain of warfare military effectiveness. His concern for tactical placement and resource allocation for an operational command to military units as an impediment to strategy effectiveness

focused on highly efficient and well-resourced military units suffering operational and strategic failures.

More recently, there has been an attempt to replicate the empirical findings within the U.S. context within the African context, particularly the counterinsurgency activities of the Somali government against al-Shabaab. Deficiencies in the command structure, logistical support, and tactical discipline inconsistencies have been documented to cause the failure of the al-Shabaab campaign's long-term security goals (Hiraal Institute, 2023). Deficiencies in the tactical and analytic frameworks of the system have also been documented in intelligence studies and have been the reason why multiple global security crises have been subject to strategic surprise. The failures in the intelligence systems have been documented in the studies of Ikani (2025). Similarly, RAND studies argue that the adversary's tactical adaptations exceed the pace of counter-tactics developed by the state forces, which leads to stagnation at the operational level, despite the existence of distinct strategic objectives (Gompert & Binnendijk, 2016).

Western ally partner, and coalition warfare are other empirical investigations. Matissek (2025) states that within a handful of U.S.-backed security assistance missions, there was a form of tactical development that was "strategy blind," in the sense that, there was little to no "politically meaningful" operational capture at the strategic level as gains operationalized at the tactical level in training and equipping partner forces. In Ukraine, the U.S. Army (2023) noted tactical level operational momentum and battles sustainment failures and demonstrated that a tactical failure in battles can cause a slip in operational level campaign stratagem timeframes. Gathering these eight empirical units' points to the central theme that strategic failures are not stand alone missteps, but are a combination of elements that define, limit, and or disrupt a national security strategy.

2.4 Literature Gaps

A considerable amount of evidence shows the tactical failure of the United States military in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Ukraine, and how these tactical issues continue to undermine the national security of the United States. Yet there remain tactical shortcomings and gaps in ascertaining and measuring such failures. GAO (2017), Kilcullen (2010), and Hiraal Institute (2023) studies show how failures of intelligence, logistics, and synergies with partner forces lead to the loss of national security. However, these studies are context specific, descriptive and anecdotal, focusing on field observation and failing to abstract the sufficient parameters and metrics that can be used to evaluate failures of tactics in other arenas of conflict. Other studies such as Biddle (2004) battlefield analysis have cataloged gaps in doctrine and gaps in coordination at the theater level, but fail to build such doctrinal analysis to a theory of strategy at the national level. It is a paradox to have evidence and observations of misalignment of strategy and tactics, but also to lack the means to measure the disconnect, and its impact, across various implementations of strategy.

The second gap stems from the empirical literature's limitations in methodological tools. Research done by Ikani (2025) on intelligence-cycle failures, Matissek (2025) on security force assistance, and U.S. Army (2023) assessments of logistical sustainment demonstrate that tactical errors are amplified into complex organizational and adaptive strategic failures. These, however, are based on qualitative accounts, case study documents, or institutional narratives that neglect the complex and compound nature of tactical failures. Gompert and Binnendijk's (2016) work with RAND acknowledged the adversary adaptation and institutional frictions but did not translate these into measurable framework variables. Therefore, a multiplicative model that aligned tactical data to organizational patterns and modified strategic outputs does not exist. This absence of cross-level,

comparative methodology, perhaps, is the most evident gap in the literature. By extension, there is little from which policymakers can forecast how tactical contingencies will impact process national security objectives.

3. Methodology

The purpose of this study is to determine the ways in which tactical failures impact the achievement of national security goals, using a qualitative, comparative case study design. This research should focus on qualitative data, as the problems with the alignment of strategy and tactics involve a myriad of organizational processes, inter-battlefield interactions, and intelligence complexities that do not lend themselves to effective representation with numbers. This design allows for the study of the interconnections between the collapse of tactics and the resulting consequences on strategy in documented cases such as U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Somalia's Counterinsurgency, tactical sustainment failures in Ukraine, and intelligence failures as described by Ikani (2025). This approach is consistent with the literature on strategic studies and military effectiveness which calls for a comparative and contextual approach to security studies.

This analysis is chiefly based on secondary sources such as government audit reports, military doctrine and evaluation documents (e.g., sustainment evaluations from the U.S. Army), scholarly works (e.g., Biddle, Kilcullen, and Ikani), and publications from independent institutes (e.g., RAND; Hiraal Institute). These sources provide empirical accounts of tactical failures and the associated consequences. To the extent possible, confidential primary sources such as after-action reports, public testimonies of officials, and open-source intelligence were also included. Primary sources provide greater scope for the analysis. A purposive sampling strategy that focuses on empirical failures of tactical maneuvers and their strategic consequences guides the selection of case studies. This sampling strategy enables the analysis to illustrate predictive patterns. At the same time, it is acknowledged that the cases were selected for their analytical depth rather than their representational adequacy.

Analysis is conducted using thematic content analysis to familiarize oneself with the main issues such as failures in intelligence, poor logistics, failures in command and control, inconsistencies in doctrine, and adaptation of the adversary. The cross-case synthesis method followed then enables a systematic comparison of the evidence retrieved from the chosen conflicts, and the systematic identification of common causal pathways where tactical level failures lead to strategic level effects. For validity and reliability, the study engaged in triangulation, providing evidence from a number of independent sources, which mitigates the chances of political, institutional or author bias. The analysis was conducted ethically, using only publicly accessible or declassified information, and the operational information was kept abstract. Consequently, we were able to maintain rigor in our methodology, which is complemented by a rich academic tradition, and were able to investigate the question of how failures at the tactical level negatively affect the security of the nation in an ethically uncompromising manner.

4. Analysis of Results

4.1 Findings on Tactical Failures

Across multiple military conflicts, there are tactical deficiencies caused by the same problems: the lack of effective intelligence, problems with sustainment/logistical support, issues with command and control, and problems with operational flexibility. Findings from the GAO (2017) related to Iraq and Afghanistan cite problems with inadequate threat assessments, poor communication flow among command units, and lack of coordination due to haphazard engagement from friendly units

as factors contributing to the failure of missions. Insufficient logistics, as pointed out by Hiraal Institute (2023) concerning Somalia, lack of sufficient unity of command within the dispersed security units, and poor military order discipline had negative consequences on the military's counterinsurgency actions. Tactical deficiencies were also evident and analyzed in the case of Ukraine, where assessments by the U.S. Army (2023) cited problems with sustainment, delays caused by the movement of critical military hardware, and poor operational tempo. These findings provide sufficient established deficiencies within the organizations that are structural, operational, and informational in nature.

Table 1. Summary of Tactical Failures Identified Across Selected Cases

Conflict / Case	Key Tactical Failures	Strategic Impact
Iraq & Afghanistan (GAO, 2017)	Weak intelligence fusion, poor coordination, inconsistent rules of engagement	Undermined stabilization, prolonged conflict, increased insurgent adaptability
Somalia (Hiraal Institute, 2023)	Fragmented command, logistical constraints, inconsistent troop discipline	Failure to secure liberated areas; weakened national counterinsurgency strategy
Ukraine (U.S. Army, 2023)	Sustainment delays, equipment bottlenecks, long logistical chains	Reduced operational tempo; strategic delays in offensive operations
Warning-Intelligence Failures (Ikani, 2025)	Analytical gaps, cognitive bias, poor signal interpretation	Strategic surprise and miscalculated political decision-making

Source: Compiled by Author, 2025

Across multiple case studies, four broad operational shortfalls have been analyzed and categorized, as shown in Figure 1, which further explained how each category represents a separate type of connectivity and failure in operational functionality. These failures can be ascribed to failures in collecting, analyzing, and integrating operational information which often encompasses gaps in intelligence and entails failure to recognize threats and or surprise attacks. Some operational sustainment shortfalls due to improper logistics encompass several of the analyzed conflicts and reflect losses in operational tempo, considering the delays in supply delivery, the poor mobility of soldiers in the field, and the inadequate maintenance of operational tempo. These conflicts also reflect the failures of command and control coupled with the inability to communicate and coordinate the activities of separate units through the synchronization of operational actions and the delivery of accurate combat orders in a complex, dynamic battleground environment. In the end, issues of field discipline include inconsistency in the behavior of combat units, failure to conform to established procedures, and a breakdown in small units' cohesion. Collectively, these categories analyze the layers of operational deficiency in tactics and set shortcuts in penetration layers of strategy.




Figure 1. Categories of tactical failures identified across cases

4.2 Patterns Linking Tactical Failures to Strategic Outcomes

A common theme has developed while reviewing the cases and it shows disruption of strategic aims due to tactical failures. An example of this would be of Intelligence failures. As stated by Ikani (2025), these escalate into strategic surprise, impairing the ability of political leaders to predict the moves of their opponents. As highlighted in both Somalia and Ukraine, logistical failures slow down the movement of troops and do not allow for the sustainment of operational initiative; therefore, stagnating or reversing the strategy. In counterinsurgency, as Kilcullen (2010) noted, the tactical level of civilian casualties and harm in combination with neglect of the local population results in a collapse of state legitimacy and therefore, long term stabilization is not achieved no matter how perfect the strategy is. These patterns suggest that the root of the strategic failures can be traced to the same, smaller scale tactical errors being replicated. These errors cumulatively reduce the credibility of a fighting force, slow operational tempo, and constrain higher level decision making, which results in tactical failures. The figure 2 showed the mechanism linking tactical failures to strategic outcomes.



Figure 2. Mechanism Linking Tactical Failures to Strategic Outcomes

4.3 Case-Based Interpretation

As is the case from the U.S. counterinsurgency operations, there is a primary case of civilian engagement and counterintelligence having a tactical range and scope which undercuts wider stabilization attempts. From Somalia, there is a case of poor inter federal and regional force coordination having a counter terrorism tactic level of scope which undercuts horizontal security consolidation at the central level. There is a case from Ukraine directly related to logistical sustainment which demonstrates that there is a tactical range scope which applied to supply chains can disrupt even the most well-equipped forces from achieving strategic timelines. There is a case from Ikani (2025) which demonstrated that tactical level analytical gaps can incur catastrophic miscalculations at the strategic level even when there is a clear strategic endpoint. These cases suggest, at least, that tactical level failures based on the connected environment have divergent and, over time, cumulative impact on the region's strategic coherence.

Table 2. Case-Based Interpretation of Tactical–Strategic Linkages

Case	Tactical Issue	Mechanism of Strategic Effect
Iraq/Afghanistan	Intel fragmentation, poor engagement	Reduced force legitimacy; weakened stabilization
Somalia	Logistics + command fragmentation	Failure to hold territory; strategic regression
Ukraine	Delayed sustainment	Slowed offensives; loss of momentum
Warning Failures	Analytical gaps	Strategic surprise; misinformed policy

Source: Compiled by Author, 2025

4.4 Methodological Barriers and Implications for National Security Planning

This research found three significant methodological barriers when evaluating tactical failures. First, evaluative limitations come from tactical performance due to the absence of uniform measures, units employing differing reporting mechanisms, and conflict-related issues which diminish data quality. Second, data deficits particularly classified material, which leave operational records out of researchers' reach and create challenges for cross-case comparisons. For instance, the majority of intelligence failures remain, at best, obstructively assessed. Third, the political/institutional culture of secrecy produces a bias in records by inappropriately contextualizing politically sensitive data, thereby leading to the absence of documented operational failures. The impacts of these barriers are considerable, which makes the constructive development of transferable operational and tactical experience models, in connection with the strategies, for the different nations more difficult.

The findings have significant consequences the planning of national security. First, strategic planning must include the ability to monitor the execution of tactics in real time, so that commanders and policy makers can detect the failure of tactics at the earliest stage. Secondly, national security institutions must strengthen the technological intelligence systems, seamless command systems, and responsive logistical systems which have been negative and primary tactical deficiencies. Third, the patterns of tactical behavior of planners must include the understanding that tactical adaptation by the opponent will exploit the tactical failure and create opportunities. Fourth, the removal of operational security which creates a lack of transparency in planning, will allow governments to improve their planning and evidence-based tactics. If these structural issues are not addressed, national strategies will be more and more out of touch and the risk of strategic failure will continue to grow.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

This study confirmed that the effectiveness of a national security strategy hinges not just on the quality of grand strategic theory, but on the continuity, consistency, and flexibility of the tactical-level strategies employed in the field. The operational reports developed from the case studies of Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Ukraine, and various documented intelligence failures all point to a clear trend: tactical failures involving the integration of intelligence, logistics, command, and discipline in the field have accumulated over time to cause operational breakdowns and strategic failures. The findings of this study demonstrate that strategically designed action plans do not work when the tactical level does not have the elements necessary such as organizational capacity, adequate resources, or structural cohesion to uphold the level of control strategy demands.

This study highlighted some of the most important methodological issues involved in the query into tactical failures as they relate to operational or strategic gaps. Operational data is often incomplete, unclassified, or unfiltered. The goals and objectives of the study are often not clearly defined and driven by political and administrative factors, aggravated by the absence of a case measurement framework at cross-case level, or a military and intelligence framework which gives rise to the study of tactical failures and operational or strategic gaps. Consequently, complete, or politically unaltered data is available to decision-makers and this severely limits the level of strategic planning and the lessons to be derived from the conflict.

Notwithstanding these findings, the research underscored the importance of congruence between grand strategy and national security success. Without effective evaluative systems on tactics, operational warning gaps, feedback loops, and strategy formulation, states are likely to lose the

same systems on other conflicts. Thus, the research demonstrates the necessity of enhanced evaluative systems, operational reporting transparency, and institutional systems design that links experiential learning to strategy.

5.2 Recommendations

For tactical assessment to improve, national security agencies should start adopting standardized reporting systems that track a set of key metrics related to tactical effectiveness across different units and different theaters, and reporting systems that reflect intelligence analysis integration, open-source intelligence, and interoperable systems with real-time updates to operational changes. Using a mixed-methods approach with qualitative field stories, location-based analysis, operational databases, and systematically released data will better fill gaps created by a lack of reporting and secretive reporting. In addition, agencies should implement independent case study audits and external assessments by think tanks and academics to reduce political and organizational bias in the tactical assessments.

Addressing the imbalance between strategy and the operational effect in a theatre of war needs to strengthen both horizontal and vertical communication between the policymaker, commander, intelligence analyst, and field operator. States should focus on the adoption of joint operational doctrines, establishment of integrated task units, and enhancement of structural interoperability between military, intelligence, and law enforcement. Strategic intent frameworks should integrate plans for continuous adaptive cycles that reassess tactical changes and integrate those assessments into the strategy. Training programs should focus on the tactical and operational literacy of field and senior officers, respectively, to facilitate better alignment of priorities and expectations. Ultimately, effective strategy needs to have institutional frameworks that ensure strategic clarity is translated into adaptable tactical assessments.

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